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POISON IN THE WELL: CREATING 
REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS FOR 
COMPENSATION AFTER SCOTTSDALE 
INDEMNITY CO. v. VILLAGE OF CRESTWOOD 
Brian Reilly* 
Abstract: In 2007 it came to light that town officials in Crestwood, Illinois 
had intentionally caused residents to use contaminated well water for 
more than twenty years. A group of residents sued the town and its offi-
cials and alleged that the contaminated water had caused illness (and in 
some cases death) to themselves and their relatives. In response, the town 
sought indemnification from its insurer, Scottsdale Indemnity Co. The in-
surance company refused to provide coverage on the grounds that the 
contamination had triggered the “pollution exclusion” included in 
Crestwood’s insurance contract. This Comment argues that when analyz-
ing the applicability of a pollution exclusion, courts should adopt a “rea-
sonable expectations” test. This test requires a court to look beyond the 
plain meaning of an insurance policy. Instead, courts should consider the 
reasonable expectations of the policyholder at the time the insurance pol-
icy was purchased. This test vindicates the rights of policyholders and en-
sures that victims of pollution harms are compensated for damage to 
their health and environment. 
Introduction 
 If you have visited the town of Crestwood, Illinois in the past two 
decades, you might have unwittingly consumed cancer-causing chemi-
cals.1 That is because from 1985 through 2007, Crestwood’s current 
mayor, its former mayor, its former water operator, and other town em-
ployees (“town officials”) secretly augmented the town’s water supply 
with water drawn from a well contaminated with perchloroethylene 
                                                                                                                      
* Staff Writer, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2012–2013. 
1 See Scottsdale Indem. Co. v. Vill. of Crestwood (Scottsdale II ), 673 F.3d 715, 716 (7th Cir. 
2012); Scottsdale Indem. Co. v. Vill. of Crestwood (Scottsdale I ), 784 F. Supp. 2d 988, 990 
(N.D. Ill. 2011), aff’d, 673 F.3d 715; Michael Hawthorne, Crestwood Officials Cut Corners and 
Supplied Residents with Tainted Water for 2 Years, Chi. Trib., Apr. 19, 2009, at 1; Crestwood 
Groundwater Contamination and Health Consultation, Agency for Toxic Substances & Dis-
ease Registry, Mar. 2010, available at http://www.epa.state.il.us/community-relations/fact- 
sheets/crestwood-pws/atsdr/atsdr-factsheet.pdf. 
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(“perc”).2 The money saved by substituting the clean water of Lake 
Michigan with contaminated well water helped Crestwood give a prop-
erty tax rebate and earn a national reputation as one of the best run 
towns in America.3 Although town officials knew they were providing 
Crestwood residents contaminated water, the local newsletter pro-
claimed that “Crestwood water ha[d] passed all the tests prescribed by 
the EPA during the past year. The results were very favorable, and [the 
town had] safe drinking water.”4 
  Eventually, the lies caught up with the town officials when the 
State of Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) mandated wa-
ter quality checks for all of the emergency wells in the state.5 Once the 
state department of health published the news that the well had been 
contaminated for more than twenty years, and that town officials had 
facilitated its contamination, people started to believe that many ill-
nesses in town had been caused by the water.6 Hundreds of Crestwood 
residents brought suit against the town of Crestwood and its officials.7 
The plaintiffs ranged from people who merely drank the town’s water 
to those who had sustained particular harms.8 
 Those responsible for keeping Crestwood safe perpetrated a wrong 
against its citizens.9 The question is this: Who should have to pay for 
the harms done to Crestwood’s residents?10 Immediately after the citi-
zens brought lawsuits against Crestwood and its officials, town officials 
tried to insulate themselves from any negative consequences by seeking 
defense and indemnification from their insurers.11 The town officials 
argued that the insurance companies should pay for any health prob-
lems or lasting harms caused by Crestwood’s contaminated drinking 
water.12 In response, the insurance companies pointed to the absolute 
                                                                                                                      
2 Scottsdale II, 673 F.3d at 716; Scottsdale I, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 989–90. 
3 Hawthorne, supra note 1, at 4. 
4 Id. 
5 Id.; Crestwood Public Drinking Water Supply Fact Sheet, Ill. Envtl Prot. Agency, May 
2009, http://www.epa.state.il.us/community-relations/fact-sheets/crestwood-pws/crestwood- 
pws-1.html. 
6 Scottsdale II, 673 F.3d at 716. 
7 Id.; Crestwood Groundwater Contamination and Health Consultation, supra note 1. It has 
not been conclusively proven that anyone was actually made sick by the contaminated wa-
ter. Id. 
8 Scottsdale I, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 990. 
9 See Hawthorne, supra note 1, at 4 (interviewing a citizen who felt wronged by town 
officials). 
10 See Scottsdale II, 673 F.3d at 716; Scottsdale I, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 993. 
11 See Scottsdale II, 673 F.3d at 716; Scottsdale I, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 989–90. 
12 Scottsdale I, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 990; see Scottsdale II, 673 F.3d at 716. 
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pollution exclusions in Crestwood’s comprehensive general liability 
insurance policies and refused to defend or indemnify the town offi-
cials.13 
 Before long, the case of Scottsdale Indemnity Company v. Village of 
Crestwood was in court, and it was up to the judicial system to sort out 
whether the pollution exclusion applied to the chemical mess in Crest-
wood.14 This Comment argues that the two most popular approaches to 
interpreting pollution exclusions are insufficient to protect the rights 
of insureds and insurers, and as a result, it can be very difficult to ade-
quately compensate victims of environmental harms.15 The minority 
approach of using the “reasonable expectations” doctrine can better 
protect the parties’ rights.16 By more sufficiently protecting both the 
insured’s and insurer’s rights, and thereby allowing better planning 
and resource allocation, this approach would likely ensure that victims 
would be adequately compensated.17 
I. Factual Background and Procedural History 
 In 1985 or 1986, Illinois environmental authorities informed 
Crestwood town officials that one of Crestwood’s wells was contami-
nated.18 Town officials learned that one of Crestwood’s wells contained 
a number of chemicals, including perchloroethylene (“perc”), a known 
carcinogen, and dichloroethylene (“DCE”).19 Perc is commonly used in 
the dry cleaning process, and once it seeps into soil or water, it can be 
harder to clean than oil.20 
 The town officials promised state inspectors that Crestwood would 
get all of its tap water from Lake Michigan, a clean source of water.21 
They also agreed to use the contaminated well only in times of emer-
                                                                                                                      
13 Scottsdale I, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 990; see Scottsdale II, 673 F.3d at 716. Crestwood, as a 
public entity, had “public entity general liability policies,” which “cover analogous risks and 
contain the same pollution exclusion as the commercial general liability policy.” Scottsdale 
II, 673 F.3d at 716. For purposes of legal analysis, this Comment treats Crestwood’s public 
entity general liability policy as a standard commercial general liability policy. See id. 
14 See Scottsdale I, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 990. 
15 See infra notes 89–117 and accompanying text. 
16 See Reliance Ins. Co. v. Moessner, 121 F.3d 895, 903 (3d Cir. 1997); Robert E. Keeton, 
Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 961, 968 (1970); infra 
notes 89–117 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra notes 89–117 and accompanying text. 
18 Scottsdale II, 673 F.3d at 716. 
19 Id.; Scottsdale I, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 990; Crestwood Public Drinking Water Supply Fact 
Sheet, supra note 5. 
20 Scottsdale II, 673 F.3d at 716. 
21 Hawthorne, supra note 1. 
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gency.22 Under state regulations, the town officials were required to no-
tify the EPA whenever water from the contaminated well was used to 
augment Crestwood’s water supply.23 The federal Safe Drinking Water 
Act did not require sampling of wells not in use, so the EPA ceased regu-
lar testing of the well.24 Despite their obligations to the EPA and to 
Crestwood, the town officials continued to draw water from the con-
taminated well for twenty-two years without informing the state or the 
public.25 For some months throughout that period, Crestwood received 
up to twenty percent of its drinking water from the contaminated well.26 
 In 2007, the EPA implemented a statewide initiative to test the 
quality of all backup wells in case the wells would need to be used in an 
emergency.27 Although the state already knew the Crestwood emer-
gency well was contaminated, the 2007 test showed a large spike in the 
level and kind of contamination.28 Throughout the twenty-two year gap 
in testing, the perc and DCE initially found in the well had begun 
breaking down into vinyl chloride, a more dangerous chemical.29 The 
EPA then undertook a more detailed inspection of Crestwood.30 By 
comparing Crestwood’s Lake Michigan billing data with its water con-
sumption data, the EPA inspectors determined that the emergency well 
had been used illegally.31 As a result, EPA inspectors informed town of-
ficials that the well was too contaminated to use, even in emergency 
situations.32 When the EPA gave town officials the option to either pay 
the cost of decontaminating the well or to shut it down permanently, 
town officials chose the latter option and the well was officially sealed in 
2009.33 
                                                                                                                      
22 Id. 
23 Crestwood Public Drinking Water Supply Fact Sheet, supra note 5. 
24 Id.; see generally Safe Drinking Water Act, U.S.C. §§ 300-f to 300j-25 (2006). 
25 Scottsdale II, 673 F.3d at 716. 
26 Hawthorne, supra note 1; Crestwood Public Drinking Water Supply Fact Sheet, supra note 
5. 
27 Crestwood Public Drinking Water Supply Fact Sheet, supra note 5; see Hawthorne, supra 
note 1, at 4. 
28 See Crestwood Public Drinking Water Supply Fact Sheet, supra note 5. 
29 Id. When perc breaks down, one byproduct is DCE, and as DCE breaks down, it 
produces vinyl chloride. Id. This chemical degradation often takes many years to occur, 
thus the 1986 test failed to discover vinyl chloride in the well despite the presence of both 
perc and DCE. Id. 
30 See id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Scottsdale II, 673 F.3d at 716; Hawthorne, supra note 1. 
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 After the lengthy deception came to light, Crestwood residents 
brought numerous lawsuits against Crestwood and its officials.34 In their 
consolidated lawsuit, the Crestwood residents sought compensatory, 
punitive, and statutory damages (as well as attorney’s fees exceeding 
$60,000).35 In addition, the State of Illinois simultaneously sued to get 
an injunction that would require Crestwood to finance a site inspec-
tion.36 
 After these lawsuits were brought against Crestwood and its offi-
cials, Crestwood’s two insurance companies, Scottsdale Indemnity 
Company and National Casualty Company (“insurance companies”), 
sued Crestwood, its current mayor, its former mayor, its former water 
operator, and the Attorney General of the State of Illinois.37 The insur-
ances companies were seeking a declaration that they had no duty to 
defend or indemnify Crestwood or its officials in the pending lawsuits.38 
Crestwood and its officials brought a counterclaim seeking a declara-
tion that the insurance companies were required to both defend and 
indemnify them from the pending suits.39 The insurance companies 
alleged that the harms caused by the contaminated well were excluded 
from coverage by the insurance policies’ absolute pollution exclusions, 
while Crestwood and its officials argued that the harms were not barred 
by the exclusions.40 
 In 2011, the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois 
granted a summary judgment motion in favor of the insurance compa-
nies.41 The district court found that the harms caused by the contami-
nated well were eliminated from coverage under the absolute pollution 
exclusion and that the insurance companies therefore had no duty to 
defend or indemnify Crestwood and its officials.42 Following their loss 
at the district court level, Crestwood and its officials appealed the rul-
ing to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.43 
                                                                                                                      
34 See Scottsdale II, 673 F.3d at 716. 
35 Answer and Counterclaim for Declaratory Judgment and Other Relief, at 94–98 
Scottsdale Indem. Co. v. Vill. of Crestwood, 784 F. Supp. 2d 988 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (No. 1:09-
CV-04472). 
36 Scottsdale II, 673 F.3d at 716. 
37 Scottsdale I, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 989–90. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 990. 
40 Id. at 994. 
41 Id. at 998–99. 
42 See id. 
43 Scottsdale II, 673 F.3d at 715–16; see Scottsdale I, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 998–99. 
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II. Legal Background 
 A pollution exclusion is a written clause included in many Com-
mercial General Liability (CGL) insurance policies.44 Pollution exclu-
sions were first drafted into insurance policies beginning in the 1970s, 
largely as a response to Clean Air Act amendments.45 The amendments 
to the Clean Air Act included cleanup provisions that would force pol-
luters to pay for any costs associated with their polluting.46 Many insur-
ance companies were concerned that in response to the amendments, 
they would be forced to pay the exorbitant costs associated with envi-
ronmental cleanups, especially those at Superfund sites.47 In 1985, the 
standard pollution exclusion from the 1970s was amended to eliminate 
its inclusion of arguably ambiguous words such as “accidental” and 
“sudden,” which had been responsible for a glut of lawsuits.48 This new 
subset of the pollution exclusion is known as the “absolute pollution 
exclusion.”49 
 The standard absolute pollution exclusion says that coverage does 
not apply to “‘bodily injury,’ ‘property damage,’ or ‘personal injury’ 
arising out of ‘wrongful act(s)’ which result in the actual, alleged, or 
threatened discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release, or escape 
of ‘pollutants’ at any time.”50 The absolute pollution exclusions defines 
“pollutants” as “any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or con-
                                                                                                                      
44 See Scottsdale Indem. Co. v. Vill. of Crestwood, 673 F.3d 715, 715 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(Scottsdale II ); Am. States Ins. Co. v. Koloms, 687 N.E.2d 72, 80 (Ill. 1997). The standard 
CGL policy provides coverage to an insured for harms suffered by a third party, including 
bodily injury or property damage. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Moessner, 121 F.3d 895, 899 (3d Cir. 
1997). 
45 Koloms, 687 N.E.2d at 80; see Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91–
604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7642 (2006)). 
46 See Koloms, 687 N.E.2d at 80; see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (listing hazardous air pollut-
ants whose emissions polluters had to monitor and imposing criminal penalties of up to $1 
million per year for willful violation). 
47 Koloms, 687 N.E.2d at 80. Insurance providers became even more concerned after 
the costly environmental disasters at Times Beach, Love Canal, and Torrey Canyon. Id. 
48 Id. at 80–81. 
49 Id. at 81. 
50 For purposes of legal analysis, this Comment treats the pollution exclusion in Scotts-
dale as a standard absolute pollution exclusion. The district court acknowledged that the 
pollution exclusion in several of the policies at issue had slightly different wording, but 
those differences did not influence the court’s analysis. See Scottsdale Indem. Co. v. Vill. of 
Crestwood (Scottsdale I ), 784 F. Supp. 2d 988, 992 n.2 (N.D. Ill. 2011), aff’d, 673 F.3d 715 
(7th Cir. 2012). 
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taminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals, 
and waste . . . .”51 
  Although it is well settled that the absolute pollution exclusion 
was developed as a means of avoiding “the enormous expense and ex-
posure resulting from the ‘explosion’ of environmental litigation,”52 
the circuit courts have primarily used two drastically different ap-
proaches to analyze pollution exclusions.53 These two approaches are 
known as the “traditional environmental pollution” test and the “plain 
meaning” test.54 There is also a third approach to analyzing absolute 
pollution exclusions that has been adopted by a minority of jurisdic-
tions called the “reasonable expectations” test.55 
 The Seventh Circuit has adopted the “traditional environmental 
pollution” test.56 Courts applying the “traditional environmental pollu-
tion” test, such as the Seventh, First, Second, and Sixth Circuits, tend to 
find the wording of pollution exclusions ambiguous.57 Such courts give 
great weight to the historical purpose of the pollution exclusion so as to 
only bar coverage for those incidents that would be recognized as tradi-
tional environmental pollution.58 These courts reason that if the exclu-
sions were literally applied, they would bar coverage for everyday oc-
currences such as tripping in spilled Drano or having an allergic 
reaction to chlorine in a pool.59 
                                                                                                                      
51 Scottsdale I, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 991–92; see Commercial General Liability Insurance Form, 
ISO Properties Inc. (2000), at 3, available at http://www.equispec.com/files/coverage_ 
forms/travelers/CG0001.pdf. 
52 Koloms, 687 N.E.2d at 79, 81. 
53 Compare Nautilus Ins. Co. v. Country Oaks Apartments Ltd., 566 F.3d 452, 455–56 
(5th Cir. 2009) (using the “plain meaning” test), with Pipefitters Welfare Educ. Fund v. 
Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 976 F.2d 1037, 1043 (7th Cir. 1992) (applying a narrower view of 
pollution than the “plain meaning” test). 
54 See Nautilus, 566 F.3d at 456–57 (illustrating the “plain meaning” test); Koloms, 687 
N.E.2d at 82 (illustrating the “traditional environmental pollution” test). 
55 Reliance, 121 F.3d at 903; see Thomas J. Rueter & Joshua H. Roberts, Pennsylvania’s 
Reasonable Expectation Doctrine: The Third Circuit’s Perspective, 45 Vill. L. Rev. 581, 590 (2000) 
(explaining that the doctrine has been adopted in some form by ten to thirty-eight juris-
dictions); Keeton, supra note 16, at 967 (stating that insurance law should adopt the prin-
ciple that “the objectively reasonable expectations” of insureds “will be honored even 
though painstaking study of the policy provisions would have negated those expecta-
tions.”). 
56 See Pipefitters, 976 F.2d at 1044. 
57 See, e.g., Barney Greengrass, Inc. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 445 F. App’x 411, 
413 (2d Cir. 2011); Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kellman, 197 F.3d 1178, 1183 (6th Cir. 1999); 
Nautilus Ins. Co. v. Jabar, 188 F.3d 27, 30 (1st Cir. 1999); Pipefitters, 976 F.2d at 1044; Koloms, 
687 N.E.2d at 79. 
58 Koloms, 687 N.E.2d at 82; see Pipefitters, 976 F.2d at 1043. 
59 See Kellman, 197 F.3d at 1182; Pipefitters, 976 F.2d at 1043. 
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 In the 1992 Seventh Circuit case, Pipefitters Welfare Educational Fund 
v. Westchester Fire Insurance Company, the plaintiff company sold a trans-
former to be taken apart for scrap.60 When the purchaser cut open the 
transformer, approximately eighty gallons of oil spilled onto the pur-
chaser’s property.61 The purchaser filed suit against the plaintiff for 
cleanup costs, which led the plaintiff to request a defense and indemni-
fication from its insurance company.62 The insurance company denied 
coverage and argued that the pollution fell under the pollution exclu-
sion clause.63 The Seventh Circuit ruled in favor of the insurance com-
pany on the grounds that a reasonable person would have found the 
discharge of oil onto the purchaser’s property to be pollution.64 
 In American State Insurance Co. v. Koloms, the Supreme Court of Illi-
nois adopted the “traditional environmental pollution” test.65 In Koloms, 
a building had a faulty furnace that emitted carbon monoxide.66 The 
fumes made their way into an area occupied by one of the building’s 
tenants, and as a result, several of the tenant’s employees became ill.67 
When the employees brought suit against their company, the company 
referred the complaints to its insurance.68 The insurance company de-
nied the claim under the pollution exclusion clause.69 In an effort to 
limit the scope of the pollution exclusion, the court found that any 
“discharge, dispersal, release, or escape of a pollutant must be into the 
environment in order to trigger the pollution exclusion clause and deny 
coverage to the insured.”70 Thus, because the leak of carbon monoxide 
was not “traditional environmental pollution” the court held against 
the insurance company.71 
 In contrast, the Fifth Circuit has adopted the “plain meaning” 
test.72 When courts apply the “plain meaning” test, they rely on the lit-
eral wording of the insurance policy itself without giving any weight to 
                                                                                                                      
60 Pipefitters, 976 F.2d at 1038–39. 
61 Id. at 1039. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 1044. 
65 Koloms, 687 N.E.2d at 82. 
66 Id. at 74. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 81–82 (emphasis added). 
71 Id. at 82. 
72 Nautilus, 566 F.3d at 455–56; see RLI Ins. Co. v. Gonzalez, 411 F. App’x 696, 697 (5th 
Cir. 2011); Noble Energy, Inc. v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 529 F.3d 642, 645–46 (5th Cir. 2008). 
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the historical purpose of the pollution exclusion.73 Courts using this 
form of analysis—for example the Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh 
Circuits—generally find that the policy is unambiguous as written and 
simply apply it to the facts of the case.74 
 For example, in Nautilus Insurance Company v. Country Oaks Apart-
ments, the Fifth Circuit held that under the plain meaning test, devel-
opmental harms caused to a child as a result of in utero exposure to 
carbon monoxide were excluded from coverage.75 In Nautilus, a preg-
nant woman was exposed to high levels of carbon monoxide after a 
vent in her apartment building was blocked, causing the gas to enter 
her apartment.76 The court applied the plain meaning of the pollution 
exclusion and held that there had been seepage of a gas, which was an 
“irritant,” and therefore the pollution exclusion applied.77 The court 
looked only to the “eight corners” of the pollution exclusion and the 
plaintiff’s complaint, without showing any concern for whether or not 
this sort of harm would normally be understood as pollution.78 The 
court stated that “[i]t is irrelevant that a reasonable insured might not 
expect this result, or that, given sufficient imagination, we can think of 
ways—not presented here—in which enforcement of this exclusion 
would lead to absurd results.”79 
 The Third Circuit, however, has eschewed both the “traditional 
environmental pollution” and “plain meaning” approaches in favor of a 
middle ground that looks to the insured’s reasonable expectations as a 
factor in interpreting the pollution exclusion.80 Courts using the “rea-
sonable expectations” test apply the wording of the absolute pollution 
exclusion literally, but also take into account the insured’s “reasonable 
                                                                                                                      
73 See Nautilus, 566 F.3d at 458. 
74 Id.; see Racetrac Petroleum, Inc. v. ACE Am. Ins. Co., 446 F. App’x 211, 212 (11th Cir. 
2011); Union Ins. Co. v. Mendoza, 405 F. App’x 270, 275 (10th Cir. 2010). 
75 Nautilus, 566 F.3d at 453, 458. 
76 Id. at 453. 
77 Id. at 455–56, 457. The court reasoned that the carbon monoxide was a “pollutant” 
within the meaning of the pollution exclusion because it fell within the dictionary defini-
tion of an “irritant.” Id. at 455–56. Under the CGL policy at issue in the case, “pollutants” 
encompassed “irritants.” Id. at 454. 
78 Id. at 454. 
79 Id. at 458. The holding in Nautilus was in direct opposition to the “traditional envi-
ronmental pollution” test, which is designed to specifically account for the sort of absurd, 
hypothetical results the Nautilus court refused to consider. See Pipefitters, 976 F.2d at 1043 
(reasoning that the terms “irritant” and “contaminant” could apply to almost any sub-
stance because virtually anything could irritate or damage a person or property). 
80 See Reliance, 121 F.3d at 903. 
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expectations”81 for what the policy will cover.82 This approach gives 
courts the flexibility to decide that even though the absolute pollution 
exclusion would generally bar coverage for a particular harm, the in-
sured’s reasonable expectation of coverage for that harm causes the 
insurer to be responsible for providing defense and indemnification.83 
 In Reliance Insurance Company v. Moessner, a 1997 Third Circuit case, 
a policyholder purchased a CGL insurance policy specifically because 
he knew a machine used by his business produced large amounts of 
carbon monoxide.84 When a worker got sick from carbon monoxide 
inhalation and sued the policyholder, the district court granted sum-
mary judgment to the insurance company on the ground that harms 
caused by carbon monoxide inhalation were excluded by an absolute 
pollution exclusion.85 On appeal, the Third Circuit reasoned that the 
plain meaning of the policy language would negate coverage.86 The 
court went on to state, however, that there was a genuine issue of mate-
rial fact as to whether the insured had a reasonable expectation of cov-
erage, and therefore reversed the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment.87 Further, the court stated that “even the most clearly written 
exclusion will not bind the insured where the insurer or its agent has 
created in the insured a reasonable expectation of coverage.”88 
III. Analysis 
 In 2012, the Seventh Circuit in Scottsdale Indemnification Co. v. Vil-
lage of Crestwood affirmed the district court on the ground that the 
harms arising from the contaminated well fell under the absolute pol-
lution exclusion.89 The district court in Scottsdale had held that the de-
                                                                                                                      
81 To ascertain an insured’s reasonable expectations, “[c]ourts . . . must examine ‘the 
totality of the insurance transaction involved . . . .’” Id. (quoting Dibble v. Sec. of Am. Life. 
Ins. Co., 590 A.2d 352, 354 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991)). 
82 Id. 
83 See Reliance, 121 F.3d, at 902–03 (reasoning that although the harm at issue would be 
excluded under the plain meaning test, the court had to consider the insured’s reasonable 
expectations in determining coverage); Keeton, supra note 16, at 967 (discussing the prin-
ciple that “[t]he objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and intended beneficiar-
ies regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be honored even though painstaking 
study of the policy provisions would have negated those expectations.”). 
84 Reliance, 121 F.3d, at 897–98. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 902–03. 
87 Id. at 906, 908. 
88 Id. at 897–98. 
89 Scottsdale Indem. Co. v. Vill. of Crestwood (Scottsdale II), 673 F.3d 715, 721 (7th Cir. 
2012). 
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fendants’ claims arose from water pollution and were thus “traditional 
environmental pollution.”90 Although the district court in Scottsdale ap-
plied the “traditional environmental pollution” test developed in Ameri-
can State Insurance Co. v. Koloms, on appeal, the Seventh Circuit created 
a new test which is arguably even more subjective than the “traditional 
environmental pollution” test.91 In formulating its new test, the Seventh 
Circuit stated that “a more perspicuous formula than ‘traditional envi-
ronmental pollution’ would be ‘pollution harms as ordinarily under-
stood.’”92 The court justified this standard on the grounds that it would 
do a better job of protecting the interests of insurance policyholders 
and insurance providers than would the “traditional environmental 
pollution” test.93 
 Because environmental damage is incredibly difficult to predict, 
the court reasoned that the “pollution harms as ordinarily understood” 
approach would force those policyholders who are at high risk for pol-
lution problems to purchase a pollution rider.94 This approach would 
create an incentive for potential polluters to self-identify or risk having 
to pay for pollution-related harms themselves.95 Furthermore, under 
this approach, insurance companies would be able to more accurately 
predict the cost of providing insurance to those insureds that self-
identified as being at high risk of causing “pollution harms as ordinarily 
understood.”96 The end result would be a system in which insurance 
companies could charge fairer rates to all of their policyholders over-
all.97 
  The Seventh Circuit noted that the contamination to Crestwood’s 
water would be excluded from coverage under its new test.98 Conse-
quently, the insurance companies would not be liable to defend or in-
demnify Crestwood and its officials from the citizens’ claims.99 Although 
the outcome of this case would ultimately force the town officials to pay 
for the citizens’ harms, the citizens would not be able to recover any 
                                                                                                                      
90 Scottsdale Indem. Co. v. Vill. of Crestwood (Scottsdale I), 784 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1000 
(N.D. Ill. 2011), aff’d, 673 F.3d 715 (7th Cir. 2012). 
91 Scottsdale II, 673 F.3d at 717; see Scottsdale I, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 1000; Am. States. Ins. 
Co. v. Koloms, 687 N.E.2d 72, 82 (Ill. 1997). 
92 Scottsdale II, 673 F.3d at 717. 
93 See id. at 717–19. 
94 Id. at 719. 
95 See id. at 719. 
96 See id. at 717–19 (explaining the importance of accurately predicting the risks asso-
ciated with providing coverage to potential polluters). 
97 See id. at 719. 
98 Scottsdale II, 673 F.3d at 721. 
99 See id. 
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money from the insurance companies.100 The appellate court said that 
its new test was more “perspicuous,” and therefore easier to understand 
than the “traditional environmental pollution” test,101 but it is not neces-
sarily clear that this test limits the pollution exclusion in a way that is 
different from the “traditional environmental pollution” test.102 
 Whereas the “pollution harms as ordinarily understood” test is new 
and therefore undeveloped, the “reasonable expectations” doctrine has 
existed in some form for more than forty years.103 For instance, the “rea-
sonable expectations” test has been used in the Third Circuit since at 
least 1978 and seems to have produced the fairest results for insureds.104 
 Under the Third Circuit’s current framework, a court must ascer-
tain whether, despite the fact that a harm should be excluded under a 
literal application of the pollution exclusion, the policyholder had a 
reasonable expectation that such a harm would be covered by the pol-
icy.105 In Reliance Insurance Co. v. Moessner, the Third Circuit explicitly 
stated that the reasonable expectations doctrine is important because 
“when the insured does not know or have reason to know of the exis-
tence of an unfavorable provision, then the insured lacks the ability to 
negotiate a more favorable insurance policy.”106 There is a genuine fear 
that without a safety net allowing coverage for policyholders’ reason-
able expectations, insurance companies would take advantage of unso-
phisticated—and even some sophisticated—customers, thus depriving 
them of their rights.107 Conversely, if policyholders are aware that the 
                                                                                                                      
100 See id. at 718–19; Scottsdale I, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 990. 
101 See Scottsdale II, 673 F.3d at 717. 
102 The “pollution harms as ordinarily understood” test, which has yet to be applied in 
subsequent cases, would seem to have the same pitfalls as the “traditional environmental 
pollution” test. See id.; Koloms, 687 N.E.2d at 79. Namely, the “pollution harms as ordinarily 
understood” test still relies upon a generalized understanding of what constitutes pollution 
and is thus open to varying interpretations. See Scottsdale II, 673 F.3d at 717; Koloms 687 
N.E.2d at 79. 
103 Keeton, supra note 16, at 967 (articulating the doctrine of reasonable expectations 
in 1970); see Scottsdale II, 673 F.3d at 717 (creating the “pollution harms as ordinarily un-
derstood” test in 2012). 
104 See Reliance Ins. Co. v. Moessner, 121 F.3d 895, 903–05 (3d Cir. 1997) (stating that 
“even the most clearly written exclusion will not bind the insured where the insurer or its 
agent has created in the insured a reasonable expectation of coverage”); Collister v. Na-
tionwide Life Ins. Co., 388 A.2d 1346, 1353, 1360–61 (Pa. 1978) (stating that the reason-
able expectations doctrine provides more fairness in insurance transactions, although it 
was not applicable to the case at bar); Rueter & Roberts, supra note 55, at 588 n.43 (ex-
plaining that a policy goal of the reasonable expectations test is to provide basic fairness). 
105 Reliance, 121 F.3d at 904. 
106 Id. at 905. 
107 See id.; Keeton, supra note 16, at 968; Rueter & Roberts, supra note 55, at 624–25. 
2013] The Pollution Exclusion and the “Reasonable Expectations” Test 113 
reasonable expectations doctrine will protect them only if they have 
made their expectations clear, they will have an incentive to self-identify 
as potential polluters and to clearly express their desired coverage.108 
 Given that the reasonable expectations doctrine is well established 
and that when it is consistently applied it meets the same policy objec-
tives as the new “pollution harms as ordinarily understood” test, the 
courts should adopt the “reasonable expectation” test instead of the 
“pollution harms as ordinarily understood” test.109 Because different 
courts have applied the reasonable expectations doctrine in different 
ways, moving forward, the courts that adopt the “reasonable expecta-
tions” test should implement it as follows: first, the court should exam-
ine the language of the absolute pollution exclusion to determine if it is 
ambiguous;110 if the wording is unambiguous it should then apply a lit-
eral interpretation to the facts of the case.111 Then, if the Court finds 
that coverage would be excluded under the literal interpretation of the 
policy, it should look at the record and determine if the policyholder 
had a reasonable expectation of coverage for the type of harm being 
excluded as pollution.112 If the policyholder did have a reasonable ex-
pectation of coverage for the specific harm at issue, then the policy-
holder should be covered regardless of whether the harm would nor-
mally be excluded by the absolute pollution exclusion.113 This approach 
would be more favorable than the “pollution harms as ordinarily under-
stood” test adopted by the Seventh Circuit because it would allow courts 
to fairly balance the parties’ rights in each unique case, as opposed to 
creating a blanket standard to apply to all cases.114 
                                                                                                                      
108 Cf. Scottsdale II, 673 F.3d at 719 (applying the “pollution harms as ordinarily under-
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113 See Reliance, 121 F.3d at 903; Keeton, supra note 16, at 967. 
114 Compare Reliance, 121 F.3d at 903–05 (analyzing specific facts surrounding an insur-
ance transaction to decide if coverage should be excluded), with Scottsdale II, 673 F.3d at 
717–21 (applying a rigid test that fails to account for specific facts concerning an individ-
ual insurance transaction). 
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  Consistently applying the “reasonable expectations” test in the 
future will create fairer outcomes for both insureds and insurance pro-
viders by ensuring that both parties are acting with complete informa-
tion.115 Insureds will be forced to self-identify by buying pollution riders 
to cover their risk of polluting (or risk paying for damages themselves), 
and insurance providers will therefore be able to more accurately calcu-
late premiums for their customers.116 By increasing the likelihood that 
insureds will be covered for harms arising from pollution (either 
through pollution riders or the insureds’ reasonable expectations of 
coverage for those harms), the “reasonable expectations” test will in 
turn allow more victims of environmental harms to be adequately com-
pensated by insurers.117 
Conclusion 
 After more than twenty years of daily exposure to toxic chemicals, 
the residents of Crestwood Village are understandably concerned about 
their health. Almost overnight, their exceptionally well-run town en-
tered the national spotlight as a striking example of political corrup-
tion and incompetence. There is little doubt that the citizens of Crest-
wood were wronged and that they deserved compensation. Because the 
Seventh Circuit created and applied a new “pollution harms as ordinar-
ily understood” test, it never even began a “reasonable expectations” 
analysis. In the long run, unless the courts adopt the reasonable expec-
tations test, average citizens like those in Crestwood will be forced to 
endure the harms of pollution without receiving adequate compensa-
tion for those harms. Without this important compensation, it will be 
impossible for victims of pollution disasters to rebuild their lives and 
their environments. If courts fail to adopt the reasonable expectations 
test, then generations of people in many small towns like Crestwood 
will be faced with the health risks and daily hardship of living in a dan-
gerously polluted environment. 
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